Since its creation in 1959, the European Court of Human Rights has had a direct impact on the national systems of its members. One of the main features of the European Court of Human Rights is that during its evolution and decision-making processes it has brought together legal systems in the light of human rights established in the European Convention on Human Rights. The present work discusses the role that the European Court of Human Rights has played in this matter by examining its development during its six decades of work, analyzing the methodology, techniques and theories that it uses to interpret the European Convention on Human Rights, and describing the implementation and enforcement of the European Court's decisions if and when they implied a change of member state home legislation.
INTRODUCTION

The European Court of Human Rights was set under the European Convention on Human Rights (formally the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). The Convention mechanism is considered a unique phenomenon in international law. Since its creation, this international Court has influenced the domestic law of many states in Europe. Likewise, during its evolution the Court has consolidated two important features: the granting to individuals, whose rights are denied, direct access to an international organ capable of protecting them; and a judicial body on the international level, competent to assess the behavior of national governments towards the compliance of human rights. In practice, this also means that the European Court may declare a breach of state's international obligations, even if, in terms of national law, the acts of local authorities were legitimate. Evidently, these features of the European Court of Human Rights had to turn it into a living mechanism capable of responding to the challenges of the globalization process, because it has created fundamental standards that are spread throughout the domestic legislation of the European states. As a result, the European Court has unified different legal cultures and can be described as a "quasi-constitutional court for the whole Europe" 1 
.
This article analyzes how the European Court of Human Rights brings together the legal systems and domestic law of states, by focusing first on the creation and then on the evolution of this Court: from the traditional positivist theory of international law, which limited the rights of privates to participate in an international legal process, to the current state after Protocols 11 and 14, which granted the court the exclusive jurisdiction to receive individual applications, and to declare the breach of international obligations. The second part of this article will examine the key developments that the court has created in order to construct a true "European Human Rights Law"; above all, the focus falls on the so-called "theory of autonomous concepts" or "theory of autonomous interpretation". This theory allows the Court to evaluate domestic legislation, by independently interpreting the terms of the European Convention on Human Rights; therefore, giving no space to states of eluding international obligations. Finally, the last part of the article is devoted to the implementation of the European Court's decisions and the incorporation of the European standards on human rights created by the Court into the national legislation. Rights. 6 The European system of human rights protection is considered to be a unique phenomenon in International Law. It has two important innovations: the granting to individuals (whose rights are denied) access to the international organ capable of protecting them; and the institution of a judicial body on an international level competent to render judgments on national governments.
It should be noted that not all of the European countries that participated in the drafting of the European Convention endorsed the idea of creating the European
Court and the right of individual petition: seven countries -Denmark, Greece, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Turkey -were opposed to it, while four countries -Belgium, France, Ireland and Italy -were in favor of it. 
EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Convention is now more than sixty years old. Each of the six decades of the European Convention had its own distinctive problem. 
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The European Court's excessive workload is due to two factors in particular:
the first is processing a great number of applications that are declared inadmissible (more than 90% on which a decision is made); the second one is processing applications related to structural issues, in which the European Court has already delivered judgments finding a violation of the European Convention, and where a well established case law exists. These applications, called repetitive cases, represent around 60% of the judgments of the European Court every year. 15 The prospect of a continuing increase in the workload of the European Court led to the conclusion that a reform was necessary if the system was to be did. The major difference is that the rules of Protocol 14-bis enter into force roughly three months after the date on which three High Contracting Parties to the European Convention have agreed to be bound by the Protocol. In contrast to Protocol 14, it has no requirement that all 47 member states must ratify it, but it will be applicable only for those member states that do ratify it. As we can see, the European Court of Human Rights is a living mechanism capable of responding to challenges. As a result, the European Court can be described as a "quasi-constitutional court for the whole of Europe" which has created "European Human Rights Law". States to review existing national legislation and legal practice.
http://www.ceps.eu/book/russia-and-european-court-human-rights-reform-court-and-russian-judicialpractice.
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THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION
The European Court has at least three very important theories which help it to bring together the legal systems of the Contracting States and which underline the European Court's case law. These are: the so-called "theory of European public order"; the "theory of evaluative or dynamic interpretation"; and the "theory of autonomous concepts (autonomous interpretation)"
17
.
First, the theory of European public order was produced by the European However, the evaluative interpretation theory was made in the Golder case, which is undoubtedly one of the most important cases in the history of the European Court. It had wide discussion of the rules of interpretation; in particular, in this case debates arose between originalists and non-originalists about the problem of "unenumerated rights". These are rights that are not expressly mentioned in the text but it is proposed that they should be "read into" it. In Goder it was right to access to court under the article 6 of the European Convention. The respondent state, the United Kingdom, argued that the European Convention says nothing about a right to access the court. As there is no explicit provision there is no obligation of the state to ensure that everyone gets to have a case heard, but if a person gets to the court she or he must be given a fair trial.
In its judgment the European Court made the hypothetical point that if the right to access to the court is not guaranteed by the European Convention, states " … could, without acting in breach of that text, do away with its courts, or take away their jurisdiction to determine certain classes of civil actions and entrust it to organs dependent on the Government …"
20
. Such assumptions, the European Court held, are "indissociable from a danger of arbitrary power" and would have serious consequences which are repugnant to the principle of the rule of law.
Thus, the European Court concluded that:
The right of access constitutes an element which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)» and stressed that «this is not an extensive interpretation forcing new obligations on the Contracting States: it is based on the very terms of the first sentence of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) read in its context and having regard to the object and purpose of the Convention. Golder did not think they added the right to access to court to art 6 ECHR; they insisted that by recognizing the right to access to court, they followed an interpretation based on 'the very terms' of the first sentence of art 6 para 1 and did not force any 'new' obligation on the Contracting States. On the contrary, they thought that fidelity to art 6 ECHR demanded granting this right. 'This is what the text says', the could have said, 'these are its very terms'.
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The third theory, the theory of autonomous interpretation, is a powerful tool (the right to liberty and security) and that the proceedings before the military authorities did not satisfy the requirements of Article 6 (right to fair trial). The government of the Netherlands responded that Article 6 was not violated, because the proceedings against the applicants involved neither "civil rights and obligations"
nor "criminals charged"; these proceedings were, under domestic law, strictly disciplinary and therefore that was not at all applicable 25 . In other words, the guarantees of Article 6 do not extend to disciplinary charges but are limited to criminal charges and the "determination of civil rights".
In its judgment, the European Court agreed that there is a distinction between disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings and this distinction is would be subordinated to their sovereign will" 27 .
As a means to prevent Contracting States from circumventing the Convention guarantees in this way, the European Court created the theory of autonomous concepts or autonomous interpretation. Since the Engel case, the European Court has developed this theory to make it a significant doctrine of its jurisprudence.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57479. 25 Article 6 reads as follows: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitle to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law". 26 Engel and Others v the Netherlands, supra note 24, § 80. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT'S DECISIONS
The European Court has extensive powers. But, nevertheless, the European . Thus the tribunal must be independent and impartial, and must have power to make a binding legal decision ordering release. In the context of these notions a "prosecutor" is regarded to be unable to possess the requisite independence and impartiality.
Before Assenov, there were some Bulgarian cases where the European Court declared violations of article 5 in regard of the prosecutor. In Assenov (1998), the European Court summed up its position as follows:
The officer must be independent of the executive and the parties. 
